











































The attached material is posted on regulation2point0.org with permission. In the aggregate, according to the Office of Manage-
ment and Budget (omb), the annual cost of complying
with federal regulations rose from $136 billion in 1988 to
$195 billion in 1994 and to $223 billion in 1998. omb’s
estimates do not account for the full cost of such recent
regulations as epa’s new air-quality standards and those
implementing the Americans with Disabilities Act.
Although it is often difficult to assess the benefits of
regulatory programs, there is strong evidence of the inef-
ficiency of programs intended to reduce risks to health,
safety, and the environment. In 1986, for example, omb
economist John F. Morrall III found that the social cost
per unit of reduction in the risk of mortality varied by a
factor of about 100,000 across programs. Robert Hahn of
the American Enterprise Institute (aei) found in a 1996
study that only 43 percent of major economic regulations
offer net benefits, and that many individual provisions of
such regulations entail net costs. Also in 1996, Tammy
Tengs and John Graham of Harvard University conclud-
ed that about 60,000 more lives could be saved annually,
at no additional cost, by changing federal regulations to
be more cost-effective.
Such inefficiencies are largely the responsibility of
federal agencies, to which Congress and the courts have
given substantial latitude in the development of regula-
tions and design of implementing programs. In addition
to agencies’ traditional ability to make policy by selecting
from a broad range of possible rules and programs, they
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INSTITUTIONS AND PROCESSES 
An independent analytical agency is needed 
to verify regulators’ claims
The Role of Economic
Analysis in Regulatory
Reform
uring the past few years, regulatory 
agencies of the executive branch have issued reg-
ulations with annual costs in the tens of billions
of dollars. For example, the national ambient air-
quality standards issued in July 1997 by the Environmental Protection Agency (epa) will cost $56 billion a year when (and
if) fully implemented, according to epa. (On May 14, 1999, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia blocked
the standards as an “unconstitutional delegation of legislative power.”)  D
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have enjoyed even broader latitude since the U.S.
Supreme Court’s decision in Chevron v. Natural Resources
Defense Council (1984). The Court ruled in that case that if
a regulatory statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to
a specific issue, the question for a court to determine is
whether an agency’s action is based on a permissible con-
struction of the statute.
And agencies often resist efforts to take efficiency
into account in applying regulations. For example, epa
and the courts interpret a key provision of the Clean Air
Act as prohibiting any consideration of cost in setting air-
quality standards. epa imposed a standard that reduced
the permissible peak concentrations of ground-level
ozone to the point that tens of millions of Americans
would have to comply with strict air-pollution regula-
tions intended for the most seriously polluted urban
areas. The more stringent standard would result in net
annual costs of $1.2 billion to $9.6
billion, according to epa. Adminis-
trator Browner has repeatedly
opposed efforts to introduce effi-
ciency criteria into the Clean Air
Act, despite the high costs of such
rules.
Because regulatory inefficiency
is an economic problem identified
and understood through economic
analysis, it is worthwhile to ask
how economic analysis can be used
to improve regulatory efficiency.
Like praising motherhood and apple pie, it is easy to rec-
ommend improved economic analysis. But perennial
exhortations to do better analysis seldom take into
account the uses and abuses of economic analysis as it is
practiced by regulatory agencies.
I argue below that the analysis produced by agen-
cies—contrary to a key purpose of such analysis—is too
unreliable for use by the public and Congress to hold reg-
ulators accountable for their decisions. I show that ade-
quate reliability cannot be achieved by peer review but by
systematic, independent efforts to replicate agencies’
analyses. I then show that the absence of independent
replication or any independent review is anomalous: all
other complicated technical information is subject to
some independent evaluation before its use. I conclude
by recommending the creation of an independent federal
agency that would replicate regulatory agencies’ esti-
mates of the economic effects of current and proposed
regulations. The presence of such an agency would
improve the reliability of agencies’ economic analyses
and make regulatory decisionmakers more accountable
to the public and Congress. The end result would be more
sensible and efficient regulation.
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS BY FEDERAL AGENCIES: 
DOES IT DO WHAT IT SHOULD?
many regulations deliver benefits that are small
relative to their costs. That observation leads me to ask
whether agencies’ economic analyses deliver what they
should deliver, namely: management tools for use by the
administration; support for claims that a rule is consis-
tent with congressional intent, in the event of legal chal-
lenges; and accountability of regulators to the public. I
show that efforts to satisfy the first two purposes are
unlikely to improve regulatory efficiency. I then discuss
how efforts to satisfy the third purpose—accountabili-
ty—might lead to improved efficiency by increasing the
ability of the public and Congress to hold regulators
accountable for inefficiencies.
Economic Analysis of Regulation as an Administrative Man-
agement Tool Economic analysis can help decisionmakers
identify the economic effects of regulatory options per-
missible under authorizing statutes. Indeed, such analysis
is necessary to achieve policy goals such as cost-effective-
ness, as set forth in President Clinton’s Executive Order
(eo) 12866 on regulatory planning and review. The prop-
er use of economic analysis as a management tool is
important because Congress has delegated so much
authority to regulatory agencies.
If senior officials in charge of regulatory policy give
weight to economic effects generally, and to efficiency
in particular, then the results of economic analyses will
be given weight in decisions about regulatory policy.
But if economic effects and efficiency mean little to
policymakers, then economic findings will be accorded
little or no weight in their decisions. The case of the
ozone standard, for example, suggests that the Clinton
administration does not care about efficiency in its reg-
ulatory decisions.
In sum, if the administration is not particularly inter-
ested in efficiency, direct efforts to improve the quality of
agencies’ economic analysis will have little or no effect on
regulatory decisions.
Economic Analysis of Regulations to Show Compliance with
Congressional Intent A second major purpose of agencies’
economic analysis of regulations is to determine their
consistency with congressional intent and thus to ensure
their defensibility to legal challenges. Most statutes that
address the regulation of risks to health, safety, and the
An independent federal agency would improve 
the quality of regulatory agencies’ economic
analyses and make regulatory decisionmakers
more accountable to the public and Congress.environment set general standards to be met, for exam-
ple, protecting the public health or the environment “to
the extent economically achievable.” The Clean Water
Act directs epa to set effluent guidelines based on “best
available technology.” epa uses economic analysis to
determine the availability of such technologies.
Analyses conducted for the purpose of compliance
with congressional intent need not be, and typically are
not, benefit-cost analyses. To the extent that an agency
can show the feasibility or affordability of a regulatory
program without quantifying its effectiveness or bene-
fits, the agency may be able to avoid analyzing the pro-
gram’s cost-effectiveness or net benefits. Analyses that
do not shed light on cost-effectiveness or net benefits
cannot contribute to the efficiency of regulatory pro-
grams. Thus analyses conducted to satisfy congression-
al mandates will not improve efficiency, with one or two
notable exceptions.
The first exception arises under the Toxic Sub-
stances Control Act, which authorizes epa to regulate
toxic substances to address “unreasonable risk.” Courts
have interpreted that standard to imply a balancing of
costs and benefits.
A second exception may arise under the 1996 Safe
Drinking Water Act, which authorizes regulations that
deviate from the conventional technology-based
approach, provided that the benefits “justify” the costs.
Although many interpret the standard as requiring a ben-
efit-cost test, the word “justify” has no special meaning in
economics. A statement that “the benefits justify the
costs” does not clearly imply that the benefits exceed the
costs. It is therefore unclear whether agencies and courts
will view the standard of the Safe Drinking Water Act as
an “unreasonable risk” test analogous to that of the Toxic
Substances Control Act.
Recent efforts by conservative members of Congress to
require that nearly all regulations pass a benefit-cost test
have failed. Opponents feared that such a requirement
would prevent agencies from regulating risks that cannot
be quantified or expressed in monetary terms.
Piecemeal efforts to change statutes have met with
mixed success. The Food Quality Protection of Act of
1996, for example, overturned a clause that had estab-
lished a zero-risk standard for carcinogens in processed
foods. But the same act also replaced a standard of
unreasonable risk with a standard of “reasonable cer-
tainty of no harm” for tolerance of pesticides on raw
produce. The unreasonable risk standard had been inter-
preted to require agencies to weigh both costs and bene-
fits in setting tolerances. The term “reasonable certainty
of no harm,” according to statements in the Congressional
Record, amounts to a risk of one additional cancer for
every million persons exposed. It remains to be seen
whether  epawill adopt that interpretation. Nonetheless,
we seem to have traded an antiquated prohibition on
carcinogens in any amount and a functioning benefit-
cost standard for a stringent health-based standard that
may be relaxed only in those rare instances where its
application would cause “significant disruption” of the
nation’s food supply. Given such scant progress toward
the introduction of efficiency criteria into statutes, it is
unlikely that the path to more efficient regulation lies in
statutory reform.
Analyses that agencies conduct
to show compliance with congres-
sional intent generally do show
compliance, but little more. Con-
gressional intent, however, is rarely
related to efficiency. Therefore,
improved analysis to show compli-
ance will rarely result in an
improved understanding of the net
benefits of regulations.
Regulatory Agencies’ Economic Analy-
sis as a Public Accounting DeviceBen-
efit-cost analysis can help to inform Congress and the
public about the economic merits and effects of congres-
sional mandates and agencies’ actions. In fact, no other
analytic approach yields a better summary of the effects
of regulations on the national welfare. Such information
gives Congress and the public a substantive, empirical
basis for praising or criticizing regulatory decisionmak-
ers. The importance of improved accountability to the
public was recognized in the issuance of eo 12866.
Improved accountability is especially important in
risk regulation because the public and members of Con-
gress often misunderstand the nature of risks to health,
safety, and the environment. Those misunderstandings
allow advocates on both sides of a debate to overstate the
issues at stake, for tactical advantage. One consequence
is a polarization of public opinion, as in the debates
about climate change. Another consequence is exagger-
ated fears of such potential hazards as alar, asbestos, and
electromagnetic fields, leading to wasteful or counter-
productive control efforts. Good benefit-cost analysis
can help to keep risks in perspective and ensure more
balanced policymaking in Congress and regulatory
agencies.
Recent statutes have tried to enforce accountability
through the use of agencies’ own benefit-cost analyses,
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Benefit-cost analysis can help to inform 
Congress and the public about the economic 
merits and effects of congressional mandates 
and agencies’ actions.but to little avail. The Unfunded Mandate Reform Act
(umra), for example, requires agencies to disclose infor-
mation about the costs or cost-effectiveness of new reg-
ulations. In particular, agencies must state whether a reg-
ulation is the least costly, most cost-effective, or least
burdensome—or if not, why not. But epa stated that a
regulatory action relating to lead-based paint did not
contain any “federal mandates” as described in umra
because “the rule implements mandates specifically and
explicitly set forth by Congress without the exercise of
any political discretion by the epa.” Similarly, epa deter-
mined that umra did not apply to national ambient air-
quality standards for ozone because epawas not permit-
ted to consider “economic or technological feasibility” in
meeting the standards. An agency may thus exempt
itself from making even a simple statement about the
nature of regulatory mandates by claiming that the
statute requires the rule or limits the agency’s ability to
consider costs or feasibility.
A second example of legislative efforts to use agen-
cies’ benefit-cost analyses for greater accountability is the
requirement that omb report to Congress on the costs
and benefits of all federal regulations. The first two
reports, unsurprisingly, provide little critical information
about the costs and benefits of recent rules. After omb
signs off on the summaries of costs and benefits of rules
issued by federal agencies, why would it offer any critical
information about the same costs and benefits?
The omb report does give aggregate estimates of the
costs and benefits of specific rules. But it does little to
advance agencies’ accountability because the aggregate
estimates do not shed light on the agency-by-agency and
statute-by-statute nature of the regulatory process.
In any event, statutory efforts to improve account-
ability through the use of agencies’ benefit-cost analy-
ses may be futile because of skepticism about the qual-
ity of those analyses. According to Lester Lave, a
respected economist at Carnegie-Mellon University,
government agencies’ analyses have major flaws in
“theory, quantification, and analysis.” Robert Hahn,
director of the aei-Brookings Joint Center for Regula-
tory Studies, argues that public-choice theory suggests
that bureaucrats defend and expand programs. Agen-
cies’ analyses must therefore be viewed skeptically
because agencies tend to overestimate benefits and
underestimate costs.
Winston Harrington, Richard Morgenstern, and
Peter Nelson of Resources for the Future (rff) compared
agencies’ prospective estimates of regulatory costs with
retrospective cost estimates by independent researchers
and concluded that prospective estimates of total costs
exceeded retrospective estimates far more often than
they fell short. But the prospective cost estimates typical-
ly assume full compliance with a new regulation, where-
as retrospective estimates are lower because imperfect
enforcement, waivers, and exemptions diminish a regula-
tion’s scope.
Comparisons of costs per unit of pollution avoided
are more relevant than total costs because unit costs are
less sensitive to changes in regulatory scope. Data given in
the rffpaper dosuggest that prospective cost estimates of
unit costs are fairly inaccurate but not systematically
biased. Prospective unit-cost estimates were as often too
high as too low. Prospective unit-cost estimates differed
from retrospective estimates by more than 25 percent for
12 of the 19 regulations considered in the rffstudy.
Having shown that agencies’ economic analyses are
generally ineffective as management tools and generally
inapplicable to questions of congressional intent, I may
now add that agencies’ economic analyses (justifiably)
lack credibility with expert analysts and with the public
and Congress. Before offering a remedy for the condition
of economic analysis in federal agencies, I assess the gen-
eral reliability of economics research and discuss institu-
tional controls used to ensure its quality.
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS: HOW RELIABLE IS IT AND
WHAT COULD MAKE IT BETTER?
lacking a comprehensive assessment of the quality
of agencies’ economic analysis, I use as a proxy the quali-
ty of empirical economics research in academic journals.
Researchers would generally agree that analyses by gov-
ernment agencies are no better than academic research.
The Quality of Economics Research in Academia The gold
standard in science is consistency with empirical evi-
dence. In economics, Milton Friedman argues that the
only test of the quality of economic models should be
their ability to predict data.
One test of whether research approaches that stan-
dard is its independent replicability. The degree of replic-
ability demanded in any instance depends on the nature
of the research. To be credible, physics experiments lead-
ing to claims of cold fusion must be independently replic-
able in their entirety. Economics research claiming, for
example, that larger government deficits lead to higher
interest rates is not subject to the same standard of replic-
ability because of the impossibility of conducting a con-
trolled test of such claims. Usually, in economics
research, independent replication requires assessing
whether the same conclusions result from the same data
and analytic methods—a lower standard of replicability.
Of course, a model based on research that meets the
lower standard may not predict data as well as other
models; thus it may be judged inferior by Friedman’s test.
Surprisingly, efforts to replicate independently the
results of peer-reviewed economics research often fail.
The National Science Foundation (nsf) funded a major
study in the 1980s that evaluated the replicability of
results published in the respected Journal of Money, Cred-
it, and Banking. Reporting in 1986, the authors of the
nsf-funded study (William Dewald, Jerry Thursby, and
Richard Anderson) concluded that “inadvertent errors
in published empirical articles are a commonplace
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Thursby, and Anderson were able to replicate the
results published in only two of nine articles whose
authors divulged their data and computer programs.
They replicated almost all of the results in a third case,
and in a fourth case their results were “qualitatively
similar” to those published in the original article. Their
findings in the other five cases were less happy, ranging
from the observation that the results “differed greatly
from those reported by the authors” to the generation
of corrected equations “quite different” from those
reported in the corresponding article. When, instead of
using data the researchers agreed to share, Dewald,
Thursby, and Anderson used data compiled from pub-
licly available sources, they generally failed to replicate
the original results.
The American Economic Review (aer), the flagship pub-
lication of the American Economics Association, recog-
nizing that peer review may be inadequate to ensure
reproducibility, now directs authors to document data
clearly and precisely and to make the data available to any
researcher for purposes of replication.
Such policies remain rare. In 1994, Anderson and
Dewald reported that only three other economics journals
routinely request data from authors. Anderson and
Dewald also reported that the editors of 22 journals
declined an invitation from nsf to request that their
authors place data in the Inter-University Consortium for
Political and Social Research at the University of Michigan. 
The problem of irreproducible research is likely to be
widespread for several other reasons:
•The authors of the nsf study reported that the
editor of an unidentified major economics jour-
nal shares the belief that the nsf study’s findings
would be little different if based on research
reported in journals other than Money, Credit, and
Banking.
•Researchers have little incentive to seek to
reproduce the work of others. To reproduce
another researcher’s work is of little value to one’s
career, is time-consuming, and requires hard-to-
get cooperation from the original researcher.
•Irreproducibility is not confined to economics
research; the statistical methods examined in the
nsf study—sophisticated multiple-regression
analyses—are similar to those used in epidemiol-
ogy and related fields.
•There have been well-publicized cases of mis-
conduct involving the publication of false
research results in fields outside of economics.
Indeed, a recent article in Nature suggests that
dozens of published papers were based on fraud-
ulent or falsified data. 
Even research that is independently reproducible, as
defined by the nsf researchers, may be significantly
flawed. A much-cited 1983 aer article by Edward Leam-
er entitled “Let’s Take the Con out of Econometrics”
points to flaws of several types: failure to reveal the sensi-
tivity of results to changes in the way a model is specified;
use of tests of statistical significance to show that results
are not attributable to chance, even though such tests are
valid only if the model specification is itself valid; and
presentation of only the model that yields the most inter-
esting (publishable) results instead of various models
with different results. Warnings about such practices are
standard fare in econometrics classes. The same warn-
ings apply to such other fields as epidemiology, which
apply methods similar to those used in econometrics.
Controlling the Quality of Regulatory Agencies’ Analyses
Available evidence suggests that regulatory agencies’
benefit-cost analyses are often flawed. Arthur Fraas and I
have found remarkable deficiencies in agencies’ analyses,
even though the analyses had been reviewed by omb and
subject to public comment. We assessed 14 epa analyses
supporting final rules for conformance to omb’s best
practices for economic analysis. (Those best practices are
low hurdles: they are necessary but not sufficient condi-
tions for sound analysis.) We found the following:
•Three of the 14 epa analyses used consistent
baselines for costs and benefits and adequately
reflected the effects of other government pro-
grams and regulations. 
•Six analyses discussed alternatives to the pro-
posed rules.
•Two analyses quantified bias and uncertainty in
the estimates.
•Two analyses discounted future benefits and
costs in a manner permitting consistent compar-
isons of alternative actions.
Although our findings are not definitive, because
they are limited to a sample of one agency’s analyses,
they suggest that the quality of benefit-cost analysis
conducted by federal agencies is poor. Moreover, our
findings are broadly consistent with Robert Hahn’s the-
sis that agencies conduct analyses to support their pro-
gram objectives.
Some members of Congress have proposed the
increased use of peer review to control the quality of
agencies’ benefit-cost analyses. For example, the Regula-
tory Improvement Act of 1999 (S. 746) would require
agencies to convene outside panels to review all benefit-
cost analyses of regulations with an annual cost of more
than $500 million. But there is no congressional propos-
al for independent replication of agencies’ analyses.
There is little hope, however, that government-spon-
sored peer review would be any more effective than aca-
demic peer review:
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•No “editor” can deny publication if the quality
of analysis is poor.
•Reviewers may take responsibility only for
those elements of an analysis in which they have
expertise.
•Agency analyses often draw on peer-reviewed
academic articles, which may not always be inde-
pendently replicable, as discussed above.
•Agency-managed peer review is unlikely to be
as independent as academic peer review; some
academic members of review panels may choose
to “cooperate” rather than jeopardize prized
memberships on advisory panels or agency fund-
ing of research.
The most comprehensive agency-managed peer
review of a benefit-cost analysis is
the review by epa’s Science Advi-
sory Board of epa’s 1997 Report to
Congress on the Costs and Benefits of
the Clean Air Act. The estimates of
billions of dollars in benefits con-
tinue to provoke deep skepticism.
Some knowledgeable observers
believe the estimates are implausi-
bly high, even preposterous.
Another case is epa’s failure to
consider the benefits of low-level
ozone in its 1997 regulation revis-
ing the ozone air-quality standard. In May 1999, the D.C.
Circuit Court of Appeals blocked the standard because the
court unanimously found epa’s failure to consider the
benefits of low-level ozone inconsistent with the Clean
Air Act. Yet epa’s Clean Air Scientific Advisory Commit-
tee had approved the risk assessment that excluded those
benefits.
Although the two epacases are not necessarily repre-
sentative, they strongly suggest that peer review will not
ensure that agencies conduct analyses that meet the test
of replicability. Because agencies can control the agenda,
peer review of their analyses is likely to be even less effec-
tive than peer-review of academic work, which does not
prevent the publication of flawed analysis.
Independent replication of agencies’ economic
analyses offers the best hope of making agencies’ analy-
ses more accurate and reliable, and therefore more
credible.
THE IMPORTANCE OF INDEPENDENT REVIEW
regulators and independent evaluators play an
important role in almost all instances where complicated
technical information is used in the United States. In par-
ticular, regulators and independent evaluators help to
ensure the credibility of technical information by screen-
ing it for flawed claims. Independent review seems ubiq-
uitous except for the case of regulatory analysis.
Claims about Private Goods Complicated technical infor-
mation about the quality of private goods and services is
generally subject to independent review, both by regula-
tors and private organizations.
Consider financial markets, for example. Accounting
firms follow standards of the independent Financial
Accounting Standards Board in preparing and auditing
corporations’ financial statements. Corporations have to
disclose information to investors in compliance with
Securities and Exchange Commission regulations. Inde-
pendent firms such as Moody’s and Standard and Poor
rate bonds based on sec-compliant financial statements.
Brokerage firms analyze that and other information
before making investment recommendations to their
customers. Individuals and institutions rely on all of
these types of information as they decide whether and
how much to invest in various securities.
Or consider a major consumer product—the auto-
mobile. epa tests the fuel efficiency of new cars and
requires estimates of city and highway miles-per-gallon
to be displayed on the sales sticker. Consumer Reports pub-
lishes the results of its own tests and surveys of fuel effi-
ciency, safety, reliability, performance, and value.
When claims about quality and safety are included
in advertising, the Federal Trade Commission may take
action against unfounded statements. The Consumer
Products Safety Commission (cpsc) can also get
involved. In the 1980s, for example, sales of three- and
four-wheeled all-terrain vehicles (atvs) more than
tripled. Following a spate of injuries and deaths, cpsc
filed an advance notice of proposed rulemaking and
sued the manufacturers of certain atvs. The rulemak-
ing was cancelled and the suit settled when the manu-
facturers and cpsc agreed to a consent decree that
required the manufacturers to provide free safety train-
ing, conduct a public-awareness campaign, and place
warnings on equipment and in manuals. When cpsc
later issued a resolution commending certain atv man-
ufacturers for their efforts to promote safety, Con-
sumers Union (publisher of Consumer Reports) issued a
press release critical of cpsc.
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Independent replication of agencies’
economic analyses offers the best hope of 
making those analyses more accurate and 
reliable, and therefore more credible.Food manufacturers can make claims about links
between foods and health only with prior approval by the
Food and Drug Administration (fda), even when such
claims are based on independent academic research. For
example, scientific research in the 1970s and 1980s
showed that consumption of oat bran lowers the risk of
coronary heart disease. A breakfast-cereal producer
asked  fda for permission to claim that benefit on labels
of foods containing oat bran. fda approved the request,
provided that the claims were accompanied by a caveat
that, to be effective in reducing the risk of heart disease,
oat bran should be part of a low-fat, low-cholesterol diet.
Claims about Public GoodsFor a more pertinent example of
the value of independent review of information about
regulatory issues, I turn to the federal budget. The devel-
opment of the federal budget plan depends, to a great
extent, on the objectivity and nonpartisanship of the
Congressional Budget Office (cbo) and, to a lesser extent,
on checks and balances between cbo and omb.
The importance of cbo’s objectivity and nonparti-
sanship is evident in the annual appropriations process.
cbo prepares a report of 10-year economic and budget
forecasts that serves as a baseline for the assessment of
alternative budgets and revenue and spending bills. cbo
then estimates the economic and budgetary implications
of the president’s proposed budget and of almost every
bill reported by congressional committees. Those esti-
mates are integral to the bill-drafting process, but they
would not be if cbo had not carefully cultivated its repu-
tation for independence.
An example of cbo’s independence can be found in
the 1993 debate over President Clinton’s proposed Health
Security Act. Clinton’s proposal would have expanded
greatly the role of government in health care, with uncer-
tain implications for government spending and revenues.
cbo director Robert D. Reischauer repeatedly warned
that Clinton’s plans to extend health coverage to millions
of uninsured Americans and otherwise improve the
nation’s health-care system would cost more money, not
less. Due in part to Reischauer’s warnings, the Clinton
proposal died.
The prevalence of checks and balances in budgetary
analysis is illustrated by the procedures for making
across-the-board spending cuts to enforce caps on dis-
cretionary outlays. Across-the-board cuts—known as
sequestration—are called for by the Deficit Control Act
to ensure that deficit-reduction targets are met. omb,
which has the authority to impose a sequestration,
determines whether a sequestration is required, but
omb is spurred to make a good estimate of the need for
sequestration because cbo makes a competing, adviso-
ry estimate.
Although budget estimates are sometimes controver-
sial, there would be more controversies if cbo were sub-
ject to overt political control and if omb’s budget esti-
mates were not reviewed by cbo. Yet overt political
control and the lack of cbo-like review precisely
describes the current condition of regulatory analysis—it
is devoid of systematic, independent review. Instead:
•A regulatory agency’s benefit-
cost analysis is released when a
regulatory proposal is pub-
lished in the Federal Register.
•The agency solicits public
comment on various aspects of
its analysis.
•Based in part on public com-
ment and comments from
other agencies, the issuing
agency publishes revised bene-
fit-cost analyses when a final
regulation is issued.
Note the absence of systematic review by academics
or by an institution not affiliated with the executive
branch.
omb has a central role in reviewing regulatory agen-
cies’ analyses. Under eo 12866 (as with earlier eos) an
agency submits to omb not only a proposed rule but also
the supporting benefit-cost analysis. omb, which has
expertise in agencies’ programs as well as risk assessment
and benefit-cost analysis, reviews the agency’s rule and
supporting analysis before the agency publishes them in
the Federal Register.
Yet, in the Clinton administration, omb generally
has not publicly criticized agencies’ analyses or regula-
tions. omb’s 1996 report on the third anniversary of eo
12866 does not refer to any letter from omb to agencies
in which omb overturned a draft regulation or criti-
cized an agency’s analysis. Although omb staff memos
critical of agencies’ analyses appear in some regulatory
dockets, such memos typically stop short of conclud-
ing that the analyses fail to support proposed regula-
tions.
By contrast, during the Bush administration, omb
returned draft regulations to agencies for reconsideration
when omb found the drafts inconsistent with the then-
applicable executive order. omb’s return letters often
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Overt political control and the lack of CBO-like
review precisely describes the current condition 
of regulatory analysis—it is devoid of systematic,
independent review. were accompanied by lengthy critiques of agencies’ regu-
latory-impact analyses. Similarly, during the Carter
administration, the federal Council on Wage and Price
Stability filed public comments on proposed regulations
and criticized supporting analyses as well as regulatory
proposals.
The fact that omb has not openly criticized draft
rules and supporting analyses since 1993 indicates the
Clinton administration’s preference, not omb’s lack of
ability.
The critical void has not been filled by other govern-
ment reviews, or by any congressional office. Even agen-
cies’ own scientific advisory panels generally do not
review economic analyses of regulations.
Table 1 summarizes the examples I have discussed in
this section.
INDEPENDENT REPLICATION AS A STEP TOWARD 
BETTER REGULATIONS
i have argued that widespread skepticism
about the reliability and accuracy of agencies’ bene-
fit-cost analyses makes it difficult to hold agencies
accountable for inefficient regulatory decisions. The
most effective means of diminishing that skepticism
is a systematic, independent effort to replicate major
regulatory analyses. Independent replication, if seen
as a form of independent review, would be consistent
with procedures that have been institutionalized in
other fields where there is reliance on complicated
technical information.
Unlike recent reform efforts (e.g., the Unfunded
Mandates Reform Act), independent replication would
not rely on information provided by regulatory agen-
cies. Replication efforts would, instead, identify flawed
analyses and help to prevent their acceptance by the
public and Congress.
Independent replication is a legitimate governmen-
tal function because regulatory information, like
national defense, is a public good and thus it is likely to
be undersupplied by private markets. As with national
defense, the consumption of regulatory information by
one person does not reduce the amount available to
others. In addition, unlike other types of information,
regulatory information may be undersupplied by pri-
vate markets because the value of the information can-
not be determined until the information has been pro-
duced. Finally, regulatory information is of little direct
value to consumers.
Two years ago, Heather Ross of Resources for the
Future proposed the creation of a congressional office
to assess the quality of analysis supporting key regula-
tory decisions. Her proposal was aimed specifically at
generally neglected provisions of the Small Business
Regulatory Enforcement and Fairness Act that enable
fast-track congressional votes to overturn selected reg-
ulations. The office proposed by Ross would limit the
use of bad analysis to support bad regulatory policies.
Because of its independence from the executive branch,
it would be able to criticize agencies’ analyses of popu-
lar regulatory proposals. It would conduct its research
in parallel with omb’s reviews of agencies’ analyses,
timing the release of its findings to coincide with the
public-comment phase of rulemaking, so that the find-
ings would be admissible in agencies’ dockets without
causing delays in rulemaking. The analyses produced
by the congressional office would likely provide addi-
tional information about the benefits and costs of pro-
posed regulations, thus improving the soundness of
regulatory decisions.
How would such an office differ from private centers
for regulatory studies such as the aei-Brookings Joint Cen-
ter for Regulatory Studies (where I am a fellow), the Center
for the Study of American Business at Washington Univer-
sity, the Mercatus Center at George Mason University, and
the Center for the Study and Improvement of Regulation at
Carnegie-Mellon University? The availability and stability
of long-term funding for
private centers is uncer-
tain. They would have 
to grow substantially
before they could ade-





is unclear whether pri-
vate centers would be
seen as objective or
political by regulatory
agencies, Congress, or
the public. The centers
would, quite naturally,
assess decisions as well
as the analyses underly-
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Table 1
Production, Evaluation, and Use of Technical Information
Subjects of  Sources of  Regulatory Evaluators Institutional  Types of 
information information authorities purchasers or  consumers
users
Securities Corporations,  SEC, FASB Moody’s, S&P ,  Investment  Private
accounting firms brokerage houses houses investors
Consumer Manufacturers CPSC, FTC Underwriters’ Laboratories, Retail stores, All consumers
products Consumer Reports mail-order houses
Health claims  Academic  Food and Drug Administration Supermarkets, All consumers
for food researchers other food stores
Federal budget  Congressional Budget Office,  Congress,  Voters
estimates Office of Management and Budget White House
Regulatory  Executive branch regulatory agencies, Congress, Voters
costs and  Office of Management and Budget White House
benefitsRegulation 46 Volume 22, No. 2
ing those decisions, evaluating  regulatory effects that are
difficult or impossible to quantify or express in monetary
terms. The centers’ assessments would necessarily have
subjective aspects and would be open to criticism by
observers and interested parties with different subjective
views about the same regulatory effects.
A federal office dedicated to the independent replica-
tion of regulatory agencies’ economic analyses could
avoid political controversies associated with the related
regulatory proposals. In particular, such an office could
be directed to address only the completeness and replica-
bility of agencies’ benefit-cost analyses, including the sen-
sitivity of the estimates to alternative assumptions. It
would not assess whether the benefits justify the costs.
Such an office would complement the private centers,
focusing on the quality of analysis while the private cen-
ters address the wisdom of regulatory proposals.
CONCLUSION
current regulatory analyses lack the broad
acceptance or respectability that they should enjoy.
Instead of serving as a point of departure in policy
debates, they invite contention. Unlike cbo’s budget
forecasts, regulatory analyses often meet with rejec-
tion by informed analysts. Indeed, some respected
analysts see many as contrived to serve a political
agenda. Such analyses cannot adequately inform the
public and Congress about the effects of regulatory
decisions or foster the accountability of regulatory
decisionmakers to the public.
Present arrangements to ensure the reliability of
agencies’ analyses are inadequate. The analyses are not
subject to outside peer review, which is unlikely to be
adequate in any event, given the track record of academ-
ic peer review. Unlike other complicated technical infor-
mation used in the United States, agencies’ economic
analyses are not reviewed by independent third parties.
Thus there is no reason, other than assertions by interest-
ed administration officials, to believe that agencies’ analy-
ses are correct and reliable.
Congress should create a new, independent, feder-
al office dedicated to the replication of major regula-
tory analyses. The mission of the office would be to
investigate whether agencies’ estimates of benefits
and costs are complete, replicable, and consistent
with results produced by other estimation methods.
The work of the office should lead to (1) a significant
improvement in public and congressional confidence
in the reliability of agencies’ estimates of costs and
benefits and (2) a better understanding of the merits
of regulatory proposals.
Most important, however, independent review would
raise expectations for the quality of regulatory analysis
and thus foster better analysis—and presumably better
regulations—in the long run. Without a better under-
standing of the effects of regulations, we will continue to
adopt many that are costly and ineffective.
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